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Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space 
Debris: Combining International 
Regulatory and Liability Regimes 
Lawrence D. Roberts* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Soviet Union launched the first space vehicle less than 
thirty-five years ago. l Since then, the exploration and use of space 
have proliferated dramatically. Activities in space have generated 
millions of pounds of debris, most of it remaining in Earth orbit. 
This debris poses a threat to individuals and equipment moving 
in space. On rare occasions, the debris also threatens the Earth's 
biosphere. 
The global legal regime that currently regulates outer space 
comprises four international agreements. This regime consists of 
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty),2 the Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Li-
ability Convention),3 the Convention on Registration of Objects 
* B.A., 1984, Columbia College; J.D., 1987, Cornell Law School; LL.M., 1992, New 
York University School of Law. An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the 
Colloquium on Selected Issues in Global Environmental Regulation, held on April 22, 
1991 at New York University School of Law. The author would like to thank Philippe 
Sands, Edward S. Binkowski, Glenn H. Reynolds, Renee J. Sokolow, and Yvonne Lodico 
for their insightful appraisals of earlier drafts of this work. 
I The Soviet Union launched Sputnik I on October 4, 1957. MICHAEL STOIKO, SOVIET 
ROCKETRY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 79 (1970). 
2 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 
2410,610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
3 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened 
for signature Mar. 29, 1972,24 U.S.T. 2389 (entered into force Oct. 3, 1973), reprinted in 
3 UNITED STATES SPACE LAW II.A.4 (Stephen Gorove ed., 1986) [hereinafter Liability 
Convention]. 
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Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention),4 and the 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty).5 Although covering a wide 
range of issues relating to outer space, these agreements (collec-
tively, Outer Space Agreements or Agreements) have not effec-
tively managed the problem of space debris. Moreover, the 
Agreements are partly responsible for creating the problem. 
The Outer Space Agreements were intended primarily to fa-
cilitate access to and use of the space environment, although they 
also included elements of environmental regulation. The Agree-
ments typically raised environmental concerns only in the context 
of efficient use of space resources or research opportunities. They 
did not attempt to provide broader protection of the space en-
vironment. These factors, as well as the complexities of the space 
environment, make it difficult for the Agreements to provide a 
solution to the continuing degradation of the space environment. 
The Outer Space Agreements embodied the state of environ-
mental law when they were drafted, but have failed to incorporate 
later developments. It is of little consequence that the Agreements 
have largely insulated outer space from changes in environmental 
law. Subsequent agreements such as the Stockholm Declaration 
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(Stockholm Declaration),6 although morally influential, lack treaty 
stature, and, thus, qave relatively little effect upon the actions of 
spacefaring nations. Their lack of effect is emphasized by the 
continued defiant practices of spacefaring nations. Agreements 
with treaty stature, such as the Vienna Convention for the Pro-
tection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention),7 are also insuf-
ficient because they have limited jurisdiction and only a tangential 
connection to the space environment. 
4 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for 
signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1976), reprinted in 3 
UNITED STATES SPACE LAW II.A.5 (Stephen Gorove ed., 1986). 
5 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
opened for signature Dec. 5, 1979, G.A. Res. 68, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, 
U.N. Doc. Al68 (1979), 18 I.L.M. 1434 (entered into force July 11, 1984) [hereinafter 
Moon Treaty]. 
6 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416 [hereinafter Stockholm Decla-
ration]. 
7 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Mar. 
22, 1985, S. TREATY Doc. No.9, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), 26 I.L.M. 1516 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]. 
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Failure of the marketplace is a more fundamental reason why 
past and present agreements applicable to outer space fail to 
address effectively the problem of space debris. Like so many 
terrestrial problems, space debris is rooted in this failure. The 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, which established outer 
space as a commons, fostered the abuse of the space environment 
by transferring individual users' costs, in the form of space debris, 
to the orbital environment. Models of terrestrial regulation can 
help guide the development of a solution to the problem of space 
debris. Direct regulation of spaceborne hazards, however, is an 
incomplete solution. A better result can be achieved through a 
combination of direct regulation and market mechanisms. 
Part I of this Article discusses the background and current 
status of the problem of space debris. Part II discusses the law of 
the marketplace relevant to the space debris problem. Part III 
examines how the Outer Space Agreements regulate the space 
environment and treat the issue of liability. Part IV examines the 
applicability of terrestrial international environmental law to 
outer space. Part V considers how market internalization mech-
anisms can address the space debris problem. This Article con-
cludes that because market dysfunction has contributed to the 
space debris problem, flexible approaches to market internaliza-
tion can best prevent further degradation of the space environ-
ment. 
1. THE PROBLEM OF SPACE DEBRIS 
In February 1989 the Interagency Group (SPACE) for the 
National Security Council submitted its Report on Orbital Debris 
(Report), pursuant to the National Space Policy Directive of Feb-
ruary 1988.8 The Report detailed the composition of space de-
bris: 7,000 pieces of debris larger than ten centimeters; 17,500 
pieces ranging in size from one to ten centimeters; and 3,500,000 
pieces ranging in size from one-tenth of a centimeter to one 
centimeter.9 The largest objects constitute only 0.2 percent of the 
8 William B. Wirin. Space Debris 1989. 32 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF 
OUTER SPACE 184. 185 (1990). citing INTERAGENCY GROUP (SPACE). REPORT ON ORBITAL 
DEBRIS 5. (Feb. 1989). 
9 Kunihiko Tatsuzawa. The Protection of Space Environment: The Problem of Space Wreck-
ages. 32 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 173. 173 (1990). citing 
INTERAGENCY GROUP (SPACE). REPORT ON ORBITAL DEBRIS 3. 
54 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XV, No.1 
total debris estimate,IO while debris ranging in size from one 
centimeter to ten centimeters represents 0.5 percent of the total. II 
The vast majority of debris (99.3 percent) is composed of the 
smallest particles. 12 In addition, micro particulate matter ranges 
in size from one to one hundred microns,13 and exists in far 
greater quantities than larger debris. Estimates of the amount of 
microparticulate matter reach into quadrillions of pieces. 14 
Tracking space debris is an arduous task, and there are indi-
cations that the quantity of space debris may be understated. The 
Space Surveillance Network, operated under the aegis of the U.S. 
military, typically cannot track objects smaller than one centimeter 
in diameter. 15 Virtually all objects smaller than this size must be 
estimated from minimal data. Moreover, a large percentage of 
the estimated debris is not based on orbital observation. Rather, 
it arises from comparisons between explosive fragmentation tests 
on Earth and the actual observed distribution of debris measured 
in orbit. 16 
This space debris has a variety of sources. Nearly one-half of 
all debris is composed of fragments created by explosion, hyper-
velocity impact, or deterioration of the surfaces of active and 
inactive payloadsY The remaining debris is composed of inactive 




13 One micron equals one millionth (111,000,000) of a meter. 
14 HOWARD A. BAKER, SPACE DEBRIS: LEGAL POLICY AND IMPLICATIONS 8 (1989). 
15 Donald J. Kessler, Earth Orbital Pollution, in BEYOND SPACESHIP EARTH, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL ETHICS AND THE SOLAR SYSTEM 47, 60 (Eugene C. Hargrove ed., 1986); see BAKER, 
supra note 14, at 27; see also General Accounting Office, Space Debris a Potential Threat to 
Space Station and Shuttle GAO/IMTEC 90-18 (Apr. 1990). The one centimeter figure is 
the optimum. Although the capability for tracking such tiny objects by optical observation 
exists, scientists consistently track and catalog only a small fraction of the fragments 
smaller than four centimeters. In addition, it is considerably more difficult to detect debris 
located in geosynchronous orbit than to detect debris in low Earth orbit. 
The geosynchronous orbit, also known as the geostationary orbit, is located along the 
equatorial plane, 22,300 miles above the Earth's surface. A satellite traveling east will orbit 
at the same rate as the planet'S rotation, and would appear fixed over a single spot on 
the Earth's surface. See GIJSBERTHA C. M. REIJNEN & WILLEM DE GRAAF, THE POLLUTION 
OF OUTER SPACE, IN PARTICULAR OF THE GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT: SCIENTIFIC, POLICY AND 
LEGAL ASPECTS 3 (1989). This configuration is ideal for certain applications such as 
communications, direct broadcasting, and weather and military observations. [d. at 13-
29. 
16 Kessler, supra note 15, at 53-54. 
17 [d. Fragments make up 49 percent of the debris. 
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by the operation of spacecraft. 18 The primary sources of micro-
particulate matter are the various components of solid rocket 
motor exhaust,19 liquid rocket motor exhaust,20 and several 
classes of spacecraft coatings, such as paints.21 
The primary hazard of space debris is the risk of collision and 
the resultant operational problems. 22 The velocity of debris in 
Earth orbit is tremendous, ranging in speed from approximately 
11,000 kilometers per hour for objects in geosynchronous orbit,23 
to an average of 35,000 kilometers per hour in low Earth orbit.24 
Given the huge kinetic energies associated with such velocities, a 
collision with even the smallest of particles can cause catastrophic 
results. Objects as small as one centimeter are capable of pene-
trating the crew compartments of existing spacecraft,25 while de-
bris one-half millimeter in size can kill an astronaut protected 
only by a spacesuit.26 
Even the smallest particles, while incapable of causing cata-
strophic damage, hasten the deterioration of various space assets. 
Mission STS-7 of the space shuttle Challenger collided with a 
paint chip measuring two-tenths of a millimeter, necessitating the 
replacement of a portion of the craft's windshield. Similarly, the 
Long Duration Exposure Facility experiences thousands of colli-
sions with microparticulate matter while in orbit. 27 Even without 
collisions, micro particulate matter can degrade delicate surface 
components such as solar arrays and special protective coatings. 
18 BAKER, supra note 14, at 3. 
19 [d. at 8. The principal components of solid rocket motor exhaust are particles of 
aluminum oxide, solid carbon, potassium, phosphorous, chlorine, sodium, and calcium, 
as well as gaseous carbon dioxide and nitrogen. Smaller quantities of oxygen and hydro-
carbons are also present. 
.0 [d . 
• 1 !d. at 9. Such surface coatings, when exposed to the extreme environment of outer 
space, tend to flake off the surface of debris and operational craft alike. Paul Recer, 
Machines Drown Out Whispers from Space; Astronomers Bugged by All That Noise, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 28, 1988, § 2, at 5 . 
•• The mere presence of the debris itself also causes problems. Its presence is especially 
harmful to astronomical instruments both on Earth and in space. The debris often 
generates undesired reflections that disturb photographic analysis and produce misleading 
spectral images of targets under investigation . 
• 3 David E. Reibel, Prevention of Orbital Debris, 30 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. 
OF OUTER SPACE 147, 147 (1988); see REIJNEN & DE GRAAF, supra note IS at 3. 
'4 BAKER, supra note 14, at 10; see also Wirin, supra note 8, at 185. 
'5 BAKER, supra note 14, at 10. 
26 [d. 
'7 [d.; see also NASA Removes LDEF Experiments, FLIGHT INT'L (Feb. 28, 1990); LDEF 
Researchers Report Erosion, Small Craters, Faded Paint, 153 AEROSPACE DAILY 288 (1990). 
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Scientific instruments are particularly vulnerable to this form of 
damage as extreme sensitivity and cleanliness are operational 
necessities. 
Although the physics of the space debris hazard are well under-
stood, the probabilities of collision are not. The presence of many 
variables makes estimating the probability of collision very diffi-
cult, although not impossible. The necessarily rough estimates of 
the amount of debris, the paucity of accurate models of debris 
density, the vagaries of future launch schedules, the nature of 
future missions,28 as well as the workings of fate,29 all contribute 
to the uncertainty.30 Scientists can, however, roughly gauge the 
hazard because they can estimate such variables. 
Studies of the probability of debris colliding with space assets 
are varied, defying easy characterization. The differences among 
the studies result from the variety of underlying assumptions. 
The primary variables, however, are the size of the operating 
spacecraft, its orbitallocation,31 and future growth trends in the 
debris population. In 1988, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) calculated the average time between col-
lisions of space debris and a space shuttle orbiter at seventy-one 
years.32 Given the projected number and length of future shuttle 
28 While one may consider most missions to be relatively benign, this is not always true. 
A vivid example of the potential for environmental abuse is the now-infamous West Ford 
experiment, where 2,000 two-inch copper needles were released into orbit to test the 
possibility of creating an artificial ionosphere to facilitate radio transmission; another 
example is Soviet antisatellite weapons tests. See Stephen Gorove, Pollution and Outer Space: 
A Legal Analysis and Appraisal, 5 N.Y. U.]. INT'L L. & POL. 53, 56 (1972); see generally GLENN 
H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY (1989); 
CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1982). 
29 Much debris originates from unanticipated explosions of rocket boosters, notably, 
for example, McDonnell-Douglas's Delta and Arianespace's Ariane. Notebook, COMM. 
DAILY, Dec. 3, 1986, at 4; Space Junkyards and Collision Insurance, UPI, Sept. 25, 1984, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. 
30 Wirin, supra note 8, at 186, citing S. V. Vinogradov, Activities in Outer Space and 
Environmental Protection, SPACE L. 135 (1980). 
31 Space debris is not evenly distributed throughout the orbital environment. The 
economies offered by certain aspects of orbital mechanics have encouraged the use of 
certain orbital inclinations, altitudes, and directions. Debris tends to be greatest in areas 
most often frequented by spacecraft. As a result, debris is most densely situated in low 
Earth orbit, 900 to 1,000 kilometers above the Earth's surface. There are additional peaks 
in geosynchronous orbit. See BAKER, supra note 14, at 36; REIJNEN & DE GRAAF, supra note 
15, at 37-39. 
32 NASA Strategy Aimed at Cutting Risk of Orbital Collisions, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., 
Sept. 5, 1988, at 217. 
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missions, the probability is now one in thirty that an orbiter will 
be damaged by debris on each mission.33 One estimate of the 
future trend in the growth of debris indicates that the odds of 
damage to a shuttle orbiter on a mission would increase to one 
in twenty-six by the year 2000 and to one in four by the year 
2010.34 
The danger of collision with space debris increases dramatically 
with the increase in the size of future orbiting assets. Studies 
addressing the effect of debris hazards on large space structures 
suggest some alarming implications: 
In general, it is estimated that a space station with a cross-
sectional area of one square kilometer orbiting at 500 kilo-
meters and an inclination of 28.5 degrees will be hit by other 
orbiting objects at least once a year. If the station is placed at 
1,000 kilometers, the probability increases to 20 times per 
year. Another set of calculations shows that a structure 100 
meters in diameter will experience 1,000 collisions annually 
with one millimeter particles and 25 collisions per year with 
one centimeter particles .... Since the extent of damage will 
depend on where the space debris strikes and the size of the 
impacting object, these figures should be sufficient cause for 
concern to NASA and its partners: Space Station Freedom 
will have a 30-year lifespan.35 
The danger space debris poses to orbiting objects is a compelling 
reason to seek resolution of the problem. 
II. THE LAW OF THE MARKETPLACE 
In an ideal economic world, the costs and benefits of any course 
of action would be borne internally by the actor. The optimum 
choice for any decision-maker, therefore, would correspond to 
the optimum choice for society. In practice, however, costs and 
benefits are not always borne internally. Rather, it is frequently 
the case that individual actions generate external costs, or exter-
nalities. 
Externalities represent costs that others-not solely the pro-
ducer-must bear from the production of a particular good. In 
a competitive market, diverting some of the costs of production 
" [d . 
.. [d. 
35 BAKER, supra note 14, at 36-37. 
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to the environment can result in a lower price for a good. Given 
the lower price, consumer demand may rise. Thus, a producer 
will often manufacture a greater quantity of goods than is socially 
optimal. 
Externalities frequently arise when individuals perceive a re-
source as so plentiful that it amounts to a "free" good. The 
economic concept of the free good is related to the legal concept 
of res communes, or the commons. In the past, oceans, pastures, 
the atmosphere, and outer space have been considered commons. 
Like free goods, commons invariably deteriorate as more and 
more individuals transfer as much of the cost of production as 
possible to these resources. Ultimately, commons fall victim to the 
exploitation of seemingly rational individual decisions. Garrett 
Hardin describes the inevitable catastrophe resulting to a com-
mons from individual decision-making in a small pastoral society: 
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each 
herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the 
commons .... As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to 
maximize gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less con-
sciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one 
more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and 
one positive component. 
1) The positive component is a function of the increment 
of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds 
from the sale of the animal, the positive utility is nearly + 1. 
2) The negative component is a function of the additional 
overgrazing created by more than one animal. Since, how-
ever, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herds-
men, the negative utility for any particular decision-making 
herdsman is only a fraction of -1. 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the ra-
tional herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for 
him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And 
another, and another .... But this is the conclusion reached 
by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. 
Therein is the tragedy. 36 
Like the herdsman, individual spacefaring nations have treated 
outer space as a commons; the externalities generated in the form 
of space debris are its tragedy. 
36 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy a/the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243-48 (1968). 
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III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND REGULATION OF THE 
SPACE ENVIRONMENT 
A. The Outer Space Treaty 
59 
The Outer Space Treaty reflects the view of outer space as a 
commons. In particular, articles I and II of the Outer Space 
Treaty have a significant impact upon the use of the space envi-
ronment. Article I, paragraph 2 of the Outer Space Treaty states 
that "[o]uter space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bod-
ies, shall be free for exploration and use by all states without 
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accor-
dance with international law .... "37 Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty denies the states the right to claim areas of the ether: 
"Outer Space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, is 
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by 
means of use or occupation, or by any other means."38 The ob-
jective of these two provisions of the Outer Space Treaty is to 
encourage maximum development of the space environment 
while encouraging equality. The principal structure is thus similar 
to a terrestrial commons.39 Like the terrestrial commons, individ-
ual parties are encouraged to take maximum advantage of the 
resource in the shortest time. 
The formulation of articles I and II must have seemed an ideal 
solution to the problem of resource allocation in space. The draf-
ters sidestepped potential political conflicts by avoiding the trou-
bling issue of sovereignty in the space environment, while simul-
taneously encouraging each nation to use the unique resources 
of outer space to their fullest extent. Although space resources 
such as gravity, energy, and the atmosphere are renewable, en-
couraging their exploitation has degraded the quality of access to 
them. 
From the dawn of the space age, commentators have recog-
nized that a commons structure might produce unintended con-
37 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. I. 
38 [d. at art. II. 
39 The commons regime for the space environment is only a general approximation. 
This formulation relies upon the assumption that no two parties will find the same area 
of space desirable for their purposes. In the event that a specific section of the space 
environment is disputed, the commons formulation tends to recede in favor of a limited 
concept of res nullius. See Lawrence D. Roberts, The Law of the Commons: A Framework for 
the Efficient and Equitable Use of the Lagrange Points, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 151, 159-61 (1990). 
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flicts between users of the environment of outer space. Article 
IX of the Outer Space Treaty states: 
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the 
[M]oon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty 
shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual 
assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, 
including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, with due 
regard to the corresponding interests of all other States par-
ties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue 
studies of outer space, including the [M]oon and other celes-
tial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid 
their harmful contamination . . . . If a State Party to the 
Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment 
planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the 
[M]oon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially 
harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in 
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including 
the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake ap-
propriate international consultations before proceeding with 
any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty 
which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment 
planned by another State Party in outer space, including the 
[M]oon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially 
harmful interference with activities in the peaceful explora-
tion and use of outer space, including the [M]oon and other 
celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the ac-
tivity or experiment.40 
The primary objective of the third and fourth sentences of article 
IX is to maximize exploitation of the space environment. Their 
only restriction is the requirement of consultations in the event 
a suspect activity would cause potentially harmful interference 
with other space exploration endeavors. These provisions do not, 
however, restrict the activities themselves or emphasize environ-
mental protection. 
The second sentence of article IX appears to provide a more 
meaningful limitation on activities that might be harmful to the 
space environment, requiring states to avoid harmful contami-
nation of outer space. This limitation, however, applies only in 
the context of studies and exploration-not use-perhaps reflect-
ing perceived technological limits at the time the Outer Space 
Treaty was drafted. Additionally, no sanction is assessed to sci-
entific investigators who accidentally contaminate the space en-
40 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IX. 
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vironment even if they have taken precautions against the con-
tamination.41 Finally, there is no clear definition of the term 
"harmful contamination." The Outer Space Treaty contains no 
definition, and there is no consensus on an inferred one. Some 
commentators have asserted that "harmful contamination" must 
be interpreted from a reading of article IX as a whole: 
[I]t was never intended that the protection offered by sen-
tence 2 [of article IX] would apply to the environments of 
outer space, the Moon and celestial bodies per se. Although 
it was suggested that possible environmental harms should 
be given a priority ranking, this listing was only to avoid inter-
ference of one activity with another.42 
Others believe that the second sentence of article IX is intended 
to protect the sanctity of the space environment itself irrespective 
of any human activity therein. 43 
Even if the most stringent interpretation of "harmful contam-
ination" is applied, the provisions of article IX bind only states 
that are parties to the Outer Space Treaty. Arguably, customary 
international law can bind states not parties to the Outer Space 
Treaty to the treaty's environmental provisions. Under such cir-
cumstances, however, interpretation of the term "harmful con-
tamination" would have to be extremely broad. Few nations ac-
tively engage in space activities at the present time, and there is 
no consistency of environmental practice among them. Thus, the 
scope of the definition remains uncertain. 
B. The Moon Treaty 
Article 7 of the Moon Treaty has elaborated upon the embry-
onic environmental provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. The 
Moon Treaty provides that "[i]n exploring and using the 
[M]oon,44 States Parties shall take measures to prevent the dis-
41 Y. M. Kolossov, Legal Aspects of Outer Space Environmental Protection, 23 PROC. OF THE 
COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 99, 103 (1981). 
42 Howard A. Baker, The Sci-Lab Perception: Its Impact on Protection of the Outer SPace 
Environment, 30 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 121, 127 (1988) 
(emphasis added). 
43 M. Miklody, Some Remarks to the Legal Status of Celestial Bodies and Protection of Envi-
ronment, 25 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 13, 13 (1983). 
44 The use of the term "moon" in this context is somewhat misleading. The Moon 
Treaty defines moon to include "orbits around or other trajectories to or around" the 
moon, as well as "other celestial bodies within the solar system." Moon Treaty, supra note 
5, at art. I. 
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ruption of the existing balance of its environment whether by 
introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful 
contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental 
matter or otherwise .... "45 Unlike article IX of the Outer Space 
Treaty, article 7 of the Moon Treaty specifically addresses the 
issue of environmental quality. Additionally, some of the influ-
ences wrought by changes in technology and capability are ap-
parent in the inclusion of environmental limitations upon use as 
well as scientific investigation. 
Nevertheless, article 7 suffers from many of the same ills that 
plague article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. The use of ambig-
uous terminology continues. Furthermore, many of the same 
issues of avoidance reemerge in article 7. The prevailing inter-
pretations of "harmful contamination" and "adverse changes" 
continue to be rooted in the conception that harmful acts are 
only those that affect human activities. 
The most troublesome issue for proponents of the Moon 
Treaty's more elaborate environmental protection measures is its 
almost uniform lack of acceptance by the world community. Only 
seven nations have ratified the agreement.46 None of these na-
tions possesses any significant space faring capability. Moreover, 
the nature of the treaty itself is extremely controversial. In par-
ticular, the treaty emphasizes the conception of space resources 
as the "Common Heritage of Mankind," as well as the creation 
of a shared resource regime.47 Thus, any modification of the 
status of the space environment beyond the views laid down in 
article IX of the Outer Space Treaty is unlikely to be construed 
as customary international law. 
C. The Liability and Registration Conventions 
The general pronouncements of environmental fealty in the 
Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty have not contributed 
significantly to protecting the space environment. Indeed, the 
absence of strict definitions of relevant terms has reduced the 
pronouncements to little more than platitudes. The Outer Space 
Treaty does set forth certain guiding principles of legal liability 
45 [d. at art. 7. 
46 Australia, Austria, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Uruguay 
have ratified the Moon Treaty. An additional six nations-France, Guatemala, India, 
Morocco, Peru, and Romania-have signed the Moon Treaty but have not ratified it. 
47 See Moon Treaty, supra note 5, at art. II. 
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in articles VI,48 VII,49 and VIIpo Otherwise, the Outer Space 
Treaty is of limited value. Like its declarations of environmental 
protection, the Outer Space Treaty does little more than assert 
that some form of international liability51 applies to the states as 
well as individuals subject to the will of the signatory states. 52 
Not surprisingly, however, where harm to the environment is 
synonymous with harm to human life and property, the appli-
cable definitions have considerable weight. 
The liability provisions of the Liability Convention and the 
Registration Convention represent the most effective regulation 
of the space environment to date. The Liability Convention is the 
primary instrument for allocating compensation for damage 
caused by space objects. Article III describes the standard of 
liability for activities in outer space: 
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the 
surface of the [EJarth to a space object of one launching State 
or to persons or property on board such a space object by a 
space object of another launching State, the latter shall be 
liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of 
persons for whom it is responsible. 53 
Although certain activities such as deliberate explosion of a space-
craft in orbit undoubtedly fall within the fault provisions of article 
III, it is unclear how far the provision extends. It is unlikely, 
however, that this ambiguity in article III would be insurmount-
48 The treaty states in pertinent part that "State Parties to the Treaty shall bear 
international responsibility for national activities in outer space including the [M)oon and 
other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or 
by non-governmental entities .... " Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. VI. 
49 The Outer Space Treaty states: 
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an 
object into outer space, including the [M)oon and other celestial bodies, and each 
State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally 
liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical 
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in 
outer space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies. 
[d. at art. VII. 
50 The Outer Space Treaty states in pertinent part that: 
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space 
is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any 
personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of 
objects launched into outer space ... and of their component parts, is not 
affected by their presence in outer space .... 
[d. at art. VIII. 
51 [d. at art. VII. 
52 [d. at art. VI. 
53 Liability Convention, supra note 3, at art. III. 
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able. Once occasion for liability arises, the standard of fault will 
no doubt be set by the appropriate adjudicatory bodies, through 
a terrestrial legal analogy.54 
The Registration Convention does not specifically address the 
issue of liability. It does, however, facilitate compensation for 
damage caused by space objects by ensuring that such objects are 
identified as clearly as possible. Articles I and IV set forth the 
minimum criteria necessary for identifying spacecraft and their 
component parts. At the same time, however, the Registration 
Convention does not entirely resolve the issues of applicability, 
ownership, or completeness of identification. 55 
Article I of the Liability Convention defines space objects to 
include "component parts of a space object as well as its launch 
vehicle and parts thereof."56 Several commentators have argued 
that this definition includes all manner of debris. 57 This view, 
however, is based more on a well-intentioned effort to confront 
the space debris problem than on an objective reading of article 
I. Some space debris would fall under the definition of "space 
object" in the Liability Convention, although it is unlikely that a 
reading of "component parts" would extend the definition to 
fragmentary debris. 58 At best, the applicability of fragmentary 
debris to the term "space object" is an ambiguity that should be 
resolved in favor of a more expansive definition. 
Although the Liability Convention provides clear guidance on 
the issue of liability, its definition of "damage" emphasizes a link 
to persons or property.59 This emphasis limits the Liability Con-
vention's ability to promote broader environmental protection.60 
54 MORRIS D. FORKOSCH, OUTER SPACE AND LEGAL LIABILITY 8 (1982). 
55 For a discussion of the pitfalls and ambiguities found in the registration of space 
objects, see FORKOSCH, supra note 54. 
56 Liability Convention, supra note 3, at art. I. 
57 See, e.g., Dr. Bess C. M. Reijnen, Pollution of Outer SPace and International Law, 32 
PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 130, 135 (1990). 
58 Summary of Discussions, 25 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 67, 
67 (1983). 
59 In the Liability Convention, the term "damage" means loss of life, personal injury 
or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of states or of persons, 
natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations. Liability 
Convention, supra note 3, at art. I. 
60 The April 1990 Report of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space, indicates that traditional utilitarian views of the space environment, 
as embodied in the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention, continue to hold 
sway in the international community. The Report stated that: 
In accordance with article VI of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
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Narrowly drawn treaty language, however, is not the only limit 
on broader environmental protection. Another stems from cur-
rent technology. Environmental costs which parallel recoverable 
individual costs resulting from collision with space objects are 
internalized very well. A liability regime, however, is an ineffective 
mechanism for internalizing environmental hazards if most of 
the resulting damage cannot be traced to a specific party. Pres-
ently, it is uncertain whether a significant amount of the debris 
generated by a spacecraft will be traceable to the launching state. 
As long as this uncertainty exists, the state will have no incentive 
to make the socially optimal investment in measures that prevent 
or reduce the propagation of debris. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Existing agreements specifically tailored to the space environ-
ment are not totally satisfactory when it comes to coping with the 
problem of space debris. The question remains whether general 
principles of international environmental law can bridge the gaps 
between the Outer Space Agreements and the protection of the 
space environment. An examination of those principles reveals 
that they provide limited guidance. 
Many consider the Trail Smelter case the foundation of legal 
liability for transboundary pollution.61 In that 1941 decision, the 
U.S.-Canadian Court of Arbitration held that a state must protect 
other states from injury caused by the acts of those within its 
control. The court found that: 
[U]nder principles of international law, ... no State has the 
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner 
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another 
or the properties or the persons therein, when the cause is 
Other Celestial Bodies, States shall bear international responsibility for national 
activities in outer space involving the use of nuclear power sources, whether such 
activities are carried on by government agencies or by non-governmental entities, 
and for assuring that such national activities are carried out in conformity with 
these principles. 
Report of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on the 
Work of Its Twenty-Ninth Session (1990), U.N. Doe. AlAC.105/457 (1990). 
The Report also stated that "[i]n accordance with article VII of the [Outer Space Treaty] 
and the [Liability Convention], States launching space objects with nuclear power sources 
on board shall be internationally liable for damage caused by these objects." Id. at prine. 
9(1). 
61 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 3. R. 
InCI Arbitral Awards 1905 (1941). 
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of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear 
and convincing evidence.62 
The Trail Smelter case, however, makes only a limited contribution 
to a theory of international liability for space debris since the 
subsequent enactment of article IX of the Outer Space Treaty as 
well as article III of the Liability Convention. 
The Stockholm Declaration, unlike the Trail Smelter decision, 
does not suffer from preemption problems, as it was drafted 
subsequent to the Outer Space Treaty and article III of the 
Liability Convention. Conceived as the prototype for contempo-
rary international environmental regulation, the Stockholm Dec-
laration is a statement of general principles concerning the 
Earth's environment. Principle 21 of the Declaration, a sweeping 
pronouncement on environmental accountability, provides in 
part that "[s]tates have, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and the principles of international law . . . the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment ... of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. "63 The use of the phrase 
'jurisdiction and control," a term of art found in article VIII of 
the Outer Space Treaty,64 makes it difficult to imagine that Prin-
ciple 21 would not apply to the space environment as well as to 
more terrestrial domains. 
Despite its broad language, the Stockholm Declaration is lim-
ited by existing treaty law and the non-binding nature of its 
principles. Some commentators, citing the Trail Smelter case, have 
suggested that Principle 21 restates existing customary law.65 It 
would be incongruous, however, to elevate the status of Principle 
21 in this fashion given current space environmental practice to 
the contrary. 
The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(Economic Charter),66 takes a potentially more restrictive view of 
development in the name of environmental preservation than 
even Principle 2l. According to the Economic Charter, "[t]he 
62 Id. at 1908. 
63 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 6, at prine. 21. 
64 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. VIII. 
65 See, e.g., Jeffrey Maclure, North American Acid Rain and International Law, 7 FLETCHER 
F. 121, 139 (1983). 
66 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. 
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), 14 l.L.M. 251. 
1992] SPACE DEBRIS 67 
protection, preservation, and enhancement of the environment 
for the present and future generations is the responsibility of all 
states .... All States have the responsibility to ensure that activ-
ities within this jurisdiction and control do not cause damage to 
the environment ... of areas beyond the limits of national juris-
diction."67 Like the Stockholm Declaration, however, the Eco-
nomic Charter is non-binding and of limited persuasive value 
given the current emphasis on development among those nations 
engaged in activities in space. 
In contrast, binding agreements such as the the Vienna Con-
vention and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol),68 generally have limited 
jurisdiction. These agreements might help establish principles 
which in turn could be used to modify the Outer Space Agree-
ments. The applicability of binding agreements to hazards in the 
space environment outside of their circumscribed mandate, how-
ever, is extremely limited.69 
V. MARKET INTERNALIZATION SOLUTIONS TO THE SPACE DEBRIS 
PROBLEM 
A. Regulation 
Existing space law has proven incapable of resolving the space 
debris problem. At the same time, terrestrial environmental con-
trols provide only minimal influence on the space environment 
given the existence of space treaty law and its interpretation. The 
resulting lack of regulation of the space commons allows individ-
ual states to transfer costs to the commons, in the form of space 
debris. Nevertheless, this market failure, to a great extent, can 
be remedied. Certain regulatory schemes employed in terrestrial 
environmental agreements, as well as the Outer Space Agree-
67 !d. at art. 30. 
68 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989), amended and adjusted June 29, 1990 UNEP/ 
OzL.Pro. 2/3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
69 For example, the chemical exhaust of the space shuttle's solid rocket boosters result 
in the generation of significant quantities of hydrochloric acid within the ozone layer after 
each launch. These deposits are believed to contribute to the degradation of the ozone 
layer. See CHRISTaL, supra note 28, at 129-30. Even if the Vienna Convention and the 
Montreal Protocol were to regulate this activity, to the extent that shuttle operations 
conflict with their provisions, they can be construed as a terrestrial industry. The link to 
any regulation of the debris hazard would be extremely tenuous. 
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ments, can minimize damage to the commons if applied to the 
debris problem. 
Two regulatory activities employed in terrestrial environmental 
schemes would help minimize the proliferation of debris: con-
ducting scientific assessments of potential hazards and dispersing 
the information to spacefaring nations. These activities, incor-
porated into the Stockholm Declaration,?o the Vienna Conven-
tion,?1 and the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea,72 increase the effectiveness of other regulations by pro-
moting more precise regulation of the environment and greater 
efficiency of space operations. 
Restrictions tailored specifically to the space environment 
would also impede the transfer of costs to the space commons. 
Potential regulations include the protection of space assets by 
regulating "traffic fiOW,"73 removing inactive satellites,74 and es-
tablishing special orbits and practices for the disposal of inactive 
70 The Stockholm Declaration states: 
Scientific research and development in the context of environmental problems, 
both national and multinational, must be promoted in all countries, especially 
the developing countries. In this connection, the free flow of up-to-date scientific 
information and transfer of experience must be supported and assisted, to fa-
cilitate the solution of environmental problems .... 
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 6, at prine. 7. 
71 See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at arts. 3-5. Article 2(2) states that: 
[T]he parties shall, in accordance with the means at their disposal and their 
capabilities: (a) Co-operate by means of systematic observations, research and 
information exchange in order to better understand and assess the effects of 
human activities on the ozone layer and the effects on human health and the 
environment from modification of the ozone layer. 
[d. at art. 2(2). 
72 Article 204 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea states in pertinent part that: 
States shall, consistent with the rights of other States, endeavor as far as practic-
able, directly or through the competent international organizations, to observe, 
measure, evaluate and analyze, by recognized scientific methods, the risks or 
effects of pollution of the marine environment. 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dee. 10, 1982, 
U.N. Doe. A/CONF 62/122,21 I.L.M. 1261. Article 205 of the Convention further states 
that "[s]tates shall publish reports of the results obtained pursuant to article 204 or provide 
such reports at appropriate intervals to the competent international organizations, which 
should make them available to all States." [d. at art. 205. 
73 Limiting the orbital inclinations of spacecraft wherever possible, and ensuring suit-
able spacing between operational assets, can minimize the possibility of collision. The 
International Telecommunications Union has partially adopted this approach on its reg-
ulation of satellite positions in geosynchronous orbit. See Lubos Perek, Traffic Rules for 
Outer Space, 25 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 37, 40 (1983). 
74 [d. See also Hassan Safavi, Legal Aspect of Protection of Outer Space Environment, 32 
PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 138, 143 (1990). 
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satellites. 75 Nations could also agree to restrict the number and 
location of launches.76 
Although these solutions might be desirable on the basis of 
environmental considerations, it is not clear whether they are 
economically efficient. Some, such as traffic flow regulation for 
spacecraft, cost relatively little in light of their benefits. Others, 
such as removal of inactive satellites, can be prohibitively expen-
sive and, consequently, far outweigh the actual benefit to the 
environment. Even procedures which might be efficient today 
might no longer be so in the future. A regulatory scheme must 
be able to adapt to changing technologies and the differing costs 
that may be transferred to the commons. Other means of cost 
internalization, such as polluter fees, carry high political trans-
action costs. Moreover, polluter fees are subject to the same po-
tential problems as other direct forms of regulation. In particular, 
the fee schedule, which is based upon the cost structure, will 
require adjustment if the cost structure changes. 
B. Expanded Liability 
Although regulation can help alleviate the debris hazard, the 
focus of any effective and flexible scheme must be on the indi-
viduals who use the space environment. Such a scheme must 
make those individuals aware of the environmental costs of their 
actions. Furthermore, those individuals must incorporate these 
environmental costs into their cost/benefit analysis. The most ef-
fective means to achieve these goals is to institute accountability 
for damage through expanded liability. Although the Liability 
Convention has limited application to the debris problem, mod-
ifications, clearly applying it to space debris, can improve its 
usefulness. 
Fully internalizing the costs which space debris imposes on the 
commons would require substantial modification of the Liability 
Convention. In particular, fully internalizing the costs would re-
quire overcoming the present inability to track and identify large 
quantities of debris. There is, however, a solution to the problem 
posed by this technological limitation: establishing a mandatory 
75 Wirin, supra note 8, at 189. 
76 Nikolay S. Natov, Some Ecological Problems in the Area of the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, 32 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 118, 121 (1990). 
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liability pool for all users of the space environment. To promote 
the safe use of the space environment, the amount contributed 
to the liability pool by those seeking to place an object in orbit 
would be linked to an estimate of the object'S potential harm to 
the commons.77 Payments from the pool would occur in situations 
where authorities determine that collision with orbital debris 
caused damage to, or the destruction of, an orbiting object. The 
utility costs inherent in the commons would be transferred to the 
individual user, thereby maximizing social efficiency. 
The liability pool would also cover the risk posed by debris 
currently orbiting the Earth. Currently, this risk is relatively small. 
Given the anticipated trend in the amount of debris, however, 
absent retroactive payments to the liability pool, a significant 
percentage of any payment into the pool would be devoted to 
covering risk already posed by debris present in orbit at the time 
of launch. Thus, it may be necessary to allocate payments into 
the pool on the basis of prior enjoyment of the space environment 
as well as present use. 
Professors Glenn Reynolds and Robert Merges have advocated 
a liability scheme patterned after the decision in Sindell v. Abbott 
Laboratories.78 Under their plan, the cost of damage resulting from 
collision with debris which is incapable of being attributed to a 
single nation or group of nations would be allocated among the 
spacefaring states proportionally on the basis of their estimated 
contributions to the total debris population. 79 While this is a 
useful starting point, a liability approach more likely to achieve 
widespread support would place greater emphasis on future ac-
tivities rather than past transgressions. The prospect of reducing 
potentially destructive negotiation among the current group of 
spacefaring nations over the allocation of "market shares" is vital 
to the success of an expanded liability system. 
A supplementary liability regime, however, is not a panacea. 
Transaction costs limit the level of development undertaken in 
the space environment. In addition, although a mandatory lia-
bility pool can redress damage caused by orbital debris, a supple-
77 Factors which might influence the amount contributed include the size, mass, method 
of propulsion; the mission and orbit of the craft; the past history of the design, if any; 
the method of launch, as well as the presence of any materials on board or used in 
construction that might result in the production of debris. 
78 See 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal.), cert denied 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
79 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 28, at 177. 
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mentary liability regime cannot necessarily distinguish between 
damage caused by debris and damage from other sources. Despite 
these shortcomings, however, a supplemental liability regime 
would quantify the measurable economic costs to the commons 
more accurately than more direct regulatory schemes. 
C. The Unquantifiable Interest 
Despite its general efficiency, there are drawbacks to a market 
approach to environmental abuse of the space commons. Inher-
ent in a system of market allocation is the assumption that only 
those who presently utilize the commons bear the burden of the 
externalities they generate. To return to the analogy of the cow 
pasture, a herdsman who makes a rational choice understands, 
even in the face of a commons dilemma, that the ultimate result 
of his policy of overgrazing will be a devastated pasture the 
following year. If, however, the herdsman's activities would not 
damage the pasture until long after he has ceased using it, the 
cost of his actions is essentially zero. The cost has been transferred 
to the future and will be borne by future users of the pasture. 
Because such users are, by definition, incapable of making deci-
sions affecting the present use of the pasture, they bear the 
burden of the externalities. 
The doctrine of the precautionary principle and the related 
concept of sustainable development attempt to address the inter-
ests of future generations. Sustainable development is defined as 
"development that meets the needs of the present without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs."80 The precautionary principle has become a popular 
method for implementing the notion of sustainable development 
by placing upon the would-be developer the burden of demon-
strating that a particular activity would not be harmful to the 
environment. 81 
80 James Cameron & Jacob D. Werksman, The Precautionary Principle: A Policy for Action 
in the Face of Uncertainty, I CIEL BACKGROUND PAPERS ON INT'L ENVT'L L. 15 (1991) quoting 
Our Common Future, (Report of the World Commission on Env't and Dev.) at 43 (1987). 
81 The relative novelty of the precautionary principle makes it impossible to narrow 
the concept entirely. Messrs. Cameron and Werksman describe the various conceptions 
of the precautionary principle: 
Most generally, and perhaps least effectively, [the precautionary principle] can 
be understood to mean that states agree to act with care and foresight when 
making decisions that may have an adverse impact on the environment .... A 
more progressive and more widely accepted understanding of the principle urges 
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These two doctrines effectively internalize the costs of damage 
to the commons that future generations would otherwise bear. 
Internalization is achieved by imposing costs-in the form of 
scientific investigation and burdens of proof-on present-day de-
velopers.82 Unlike the market approach, the precautionary prin-
ciple requires the present generation to forego potential devel-
opment by placing costs on the present generation. As a 
consequence, application of the precautionary principle is most 
appropriate and effective where the effects of activities would 
not be evident for decades, damage to the environment would 
be catastrophic and difficult to reverse, and accurate estimates of 
future damage are extremely difficult to obtain. 
These particular facets of the precautionary principle have 
made the doctrine extremely popular in recent years for several 
terrestrial commons problems such as ozone depletion,83 global 
warming,84 and ocean dumping.85 Its application to the space 
environment, however, may be an overreaction to the problem. 
that substances or activities that may be harmful to the environment should be 
regulated even if conclusive evidence of their harmfulness is not as yet available 
.... At its most profound, the precautionary principle would institutionalize 
precaution, and shift the burden of proof from those opposing environmental 
degradation to those engaged in the challenged activity .... 
Cameron & Werksman, supra note 80, at 1. 
82 See id. 
83 See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 68. The Montreal Protocol states: 
The parties to this Protocol [are) determined to protect the ozone layer by taking 
precautionary measures to control equitably total global emissions of substances 
that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their elimination on the basis of 
developments in scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic 
considerations and bearing in mind the developmental needs of developing 
countries. 
/d. at A-4. 
84 The Final Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference states: 
In order to achieve sustainable development in all countries and to meet the 
needs of present and future generations, precautionary measures to meet the climate 
challenge must anticipate, attack, or minimize the causes of, and mitigate the 
adverse consequences of, environmental degradation that might result from 
climate change. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent such environmental degradation. The measures 
adopted should take into account different socio-economic contexts. 
Final Ministerial Declaration, Second World Climate Conference, Geneva Switzerland, Nov. 
7, 1990, at ~ 7. 
85 The Third International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea states: "[the 
ministers pledged to) continue to apply the precautionary principle, that is to take action to 
avoid potentially damaging impacts of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to 
bioaccumulate even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between 
emissions and effects." Ministerial Declaration, Third International Conference on the 
Protection of the North Sea, the Hague, Mar. 8, 1990, at A-3. 
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The hazard that debris poses in the space environment, though 
uncertain, can be estimated. Damage to space assets can typically 
be identified. Most importantly, the effects of space debris will be 
felt largely in the near future. These factors should permit less 
drastic market approaches to address the problem. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the dawn of the space age thirty-five years ago, mankind's 
activities in space have grown dramatically. These activities have 
left behind millions of pounds of debris in Earth orbit. The early 
Outer Space Agreements, intended to facilitate access and use of 
the space environment, actually contributed to the debris prob-
lem. The Agreements fostered treatment of the space environ-
ment as a commons, and spacefaring nations transferred the costs 
of their activities--externalities-to the commons in the form of 
debris. Thus, the problem of space debris is essentially the result 
of a market dysfunction. 
Although there are a number of potential responses to the 
problem space debris poses to the space commons, a market 
internalization approach is the best means to redress the market 
dysfunction. Existing terrestrial environmental law does not ef-
fectively transfer to the space environment. Existing agreements 
regulating the space environment do not specifically address the 
debris problem and would require significant modification. 
Rather, market internalization measures, including regulation 
and expanded forms of liability, can effectively diminish or even 
eliminate the tragedy of the outer space commons. 
